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Europako integrazioak estatuaren eta nazioaren arteko harremanak bideratzeko eremu berria
ekarri du. Burujabetzaren esanahi berriak, eskumenen berresleipenak eta sare berrien sorrerak
estatutasunera iristen ez diren naziotasunaren adierazpen berriak ahalbidetu dituzte. Nazio-mugi-
menduak egokitu egin dira, tradizio erabilgarriak, lurralde-oinarria eta europar arauetatik gertuko
errotze ideologikoa dituzten kasuetan. Hala ere, Europako Batasunak aukera gutxi eskaintzen dizkie
estaturik gabeko nazioei.
Giltza-Hitzak: Nazionalismoa. Europa. Gutxiengo Nazionalak. Burujabetza.
La integración europea presenta un Nuevo contexto para la relación entre Estado y nación.
Nuevos significados de soberanía, una reasignación de competencias y el surgimiento de nuevas
redes posibilitan expresiones de nacionalidad que no llegan a la estatalidad. Los movimientos de
nacionalidad se han adaptado en aquellos casos en los que cuentan con tradiciones utilizables, una
base territorial y una alineación ideológica cercana a la norma europea. La UE, sin embargo, propor-
ciona pocas posibilidades institucionales para las naciones sin estado.
Palabras Clave: Nacionalismo. Europa. Minorías Nacionales. Soberanía.
L’intégration européenne présente un nouveau contexte de rapports entre l’État et la nation. De
nouvelles notions de souveraineté, une réassignation des compétences et l’apparition de nouveaux
réseaux, permettant des expressions de la nationalité qui n’assurent cependant pas la stabilité. Les
mouvements de nationalité s’y sont adaptés lorsqu’ils comptent des traditions utilisables, une base
territoriale et un alignement idéologique proche des normatives européennes. L’UE offre, cependant,
peu de possibilités institutionnelles pour les nations sans État.
Mots Clé : Nationalise. Europe. Minorités Nationales. Souveraineté.
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THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION
The ‘nationalities question’, or the lack of it between state borders and
national groups, has been a recurrent feature of European politics since the con-
solidation of states in the nineteenth century. Such a misfit can arise because of
unification nationalism in fragmented territories, irredentism where a national
minority is detached from its external homeland,1 the existence of a minority
straddling borders of two states neither of which is its homeland, or the presence
of a nation contained within a wider state. This apposition and opposition
between state and nation has been transformed by the creation of an overarch-
ing but multifaceted European polity above both. Some see this transnational
integration as a way of ending the nationalities issue, itself the product of a
phase of modernity that is now being transcended.2 Others see it disappearing in
a post-nationalism, a Europe of the Regions, or a new medievalism.3
Increasingly, however, transnational integration and the rise of new or revival of
old nationality demands are seen as complementary processes, a reshaping of
the connections among territory, function and identity and a consequent restruc-
turing of political authority. 
This article explores the links between sub-state nationality claims and
European integration and the ways in which Europe can help by providing a
‘third way’ between national separatism and regional devolution. There are
three levels here. The first concerns the transformation of the state, in both
functional and normative dimensions. The second is the transformation of
nationality movements towards doctrines of shared sovereignty, and the diffu-
sion of liberal, democratic and inclusive norms within European political space.
Functional change encouraged a ‘new regionalism’ as state competencies are
shifted upwards and downwards, and sub-state and transnational territories
emerge as a significant framework for economic, social and political change.
Third, Europe opens up opportunity structures for nationality movements. The
impact of these changes on national movements and their ability to exploit
them varies. The European project provides incentives to de-ethnicize, to forge
a civic, territorial project, to play down separatism and to enter into the game of
multilevel politics; but not all nationalist movements have been able or willing to
adapt.
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1. STATE TRANSFORMATION
European integration is part of a wider process of state transformation4 as
well as unique process of polity building. It undermines the traditional identity
among sovereignty, territory, nationality and function that are the essence of the
traditional nation-state and opens the way to other conceptions of political
authority and of public action. 
First, European integration undermines state competencies in matters such
as market unity and regulation, the currency and external security.5 This reduces
the need for the traditional state apparatus and encourages a move towards new
forms of public policy instruments, and of territorial autonomy. To the degree that
functions requiring a common regime are taken up to the European level, it also
weakens arguments against constitutional asymmetry within states
Second, Europe challenges the doctrine of unitary and exclusive state sover-
eignty, by constituting a legal order, encouraging a legal and constitutional plu-
ralism, in which distinct normative orders coexist.6 The demystification of state
sovereignty at the European level has led to a more general loss of ideological
hegemony and opened up a discursive space for doctrines of shared sovereignty
and constitutional pluralism within and across states.
Third, European integration has undermined the old claim7 that democracy
can only function in nationally homogeneous territories, which provide a com-
mon identity and trust. If Europe must manage with multiple demoi or without
one at all, then the same argument can be applied to multinational states with-
in it.
Fourth, Europe, in the form of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights, separates human rights from nationality and citizenship, under-
mining state claims to be the bearers of universal rights or the only means to
secure them. This also undermines some powerful normative arguments against
asymmetrical government within the state.8
4. Martin Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999).
5. External security has been collectivized at the supranational level. The only question is whet-
her this is to be within a predominantly European or a broader transatlantic framework. 
6. Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State and Nation in the European
Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Neil Walker, ‘European Constitutionalism
and European Integration’, Public Law (Summer, 1996): 266-90.
Neil Walker, “Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European Union”, European Law
Journal, 4.4 (1998): 355-88.
7. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Considerations on Representative Government
(London: Dent, 1972). David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
8. In the United Kingdom the only statutory charter of rights is the European one, incorporated
differently into the legal systems of the four nations.
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Fifth, European transnational regimes, notably but not exclusively the
European Union, have provided new opportunity structures beyond the state for
nationality movements, often in alliance with regions.
All this has provided incentives to national minority parties to rethink their ideol-
ogy and policy stance, to adapt to functional change and to seek a place in the new
European architecture. Yet not all parties are able to make the necessary shifts. 
2. POST-SOVEREIGNTY 
For some, like the Scottish National Party (SNP), European integration pro-
vides an external support system for independence. Yet there is no provision in
European law for secession and the prevailing international norms strongly dis-
courage it. Independence within Europe may represent an attenuated and less
risky form of independence, since many of the externalities are catered for, but it
does require secession. 
More interestingly and subtly, in other cases it provides a new discursive
space within which to project nationality claims. It has allowed some movements
to abandon traditional claims for sovereign statehood and adopt a ‘postsover-
eigntist’ position based on shared sovereignty and authority. Post-sovereignty9
does not mean the end of sovereignty, but rather its transformation so that it is
no longer monopolized by the state but becomes a claim to original authority,
which can be advanced by various actors and institutions, and is intrinsically
divisible. This is a common theme of discourse among Europeanists and nation-
al minorities and these two levels are increasingly linked so that the European
discourse becomes part of the constitutive fabric of nationalist movements
themselves.10 Apart from providing doctrines of limited and shared sovereignty,
this allows them to build or rebuild the nation internally by projecting it external-
ly as part of a European family.
By the 1990s, most nationalist parties had abandoned independence and
substituted other formulations, emphasizing self-determination, insertion into
Europe or asymmetrical federalism. Some parties have long been ambivalent.
Convergència i Unió in Catalonia has never supported independence, although
some of its militants do. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya favours indepen-
dence only in the long term, as part of Europe of the Peoples transcending the old
model of statehood. The Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco,
PNV) has independentist and non-separatist strands but in 2003 the lehendakari
(Basque first minister) produced a plan providing for a ‘freely associated state’
9. The concept is discussed at greater length in Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy.
Stateless Nations in a Post-Soverereignty Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
10. Montserrat Guibernau, Nations without States. Political Communities in a Global Age
(Cambridge: Polity, 1999). David McCrone, The Sociology of Nationalism (London: Routledge,
1998). Stéphane Paquin, La revanche des petites nations. Le Québec, l’Écosse et la Catalogne face
à la mondialisation (Montreal: vlb, 2001).
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linked to Spain and, directly, to Europe.11 In Flanders, Volksunie contained both
federalist and independentist elements until 2002 when it split into a separatist
and a post-sovereigntist party (Spirit). Plaid Cymru- Party of Wales has long been
ambivalent about the meaning of self-government but in 2001 explicitly stated
that in the European context national independence was no longer needed. Even
within the SNP, there are may who favour the Catalan approach. The moderate
nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party of Northern Ireland is strongly pro-
European and broader currents within both parts of Ireland have embraced
Europeanism as a means for transcending the division of Ireland.12
Across Eastern and Central Europe, the European theme has been taken up
by minorities as a substitute for irredentism and as a counter to the old revan-
chiste attitudes found during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Silesian autono-
mists, long torn between Polish and German identities, and with a history of irre-
dentism and expulsions, now stress the Europe of the Regions theme and
autonomy within a reconfigured Polish state.13 Hungarians in the Banat region of
Romania emphasize their essentially European character.14 The Democratic
Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, a centre-right party linked to the Christian
Democratic movement and European People’s Party (EPP), also emphasizes its
European mission, which allows it to claim that Hungarians are both a constituent
element of the Romanian state and part of a wider Hungarian nation.15 The Party
of Hungarian Coalition in Slovakia, also linked to the EPP, dreams of a Europe of
the ‘natural’ Regions, reflecting culture and identity. Regionalists and minorities in
eastern Europe have also drawn on the examples of mobilization in the west.16
3. CIVIC NATIONALISM
The normative dimension of Europe extends to a broader value framework,
founded on rejection of Fascism in the aftermath of the Second World War and
emphasizing democracy and tolerance. Nationalism was widely discredited and
11. Juan José Ibarretxe, Nuevo pacto político para la convivencia (www.euskadi.net/kon pon bi -
deak/nuevopacto (Basque Government, 2002).
12. John McGarry, “Globalization, European Integration and the Northern Ireland Conflict”, in
Michael Keating and John McGarry (eds), Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order
(Oxford: Oxford University Press (2001).
13. Wanda Dressler Holohan and Maria Ciechocinska, “The recomposition of identity and politi-
cal space in Euorpe: The case of Upper Silesia”, in Liam O’Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson (eds),
Borders, Nations and States (Aldershot: Averbury, 1996).
14. Judy Batt, (2002), “Reinventing Banat”, Regional and Federal Studies, 12.2 (2002):178-
202. Judy Batt, “’Fuzzy Statehood’ versus Hard Borders: The Impact of EU Enlargement on Romania
and Yugoslavia”, in Michael Keating and James Hughes (eds), The Regional Challenge in Central and
Eastern Europe, Territorial Restructuring and European Integration (Brussels: Presses interuniversitaires
européennes/Peter Lang, 2003).
15. DAHR (1998), Democratic Alliance of Hungarians of Romania, Programme
(www.hhrf.org/rmdsz/).
16. Karoly Gruber, (2002), Constitutional regions, stateless nations and the Future of Europe
debate, (Brussels: The European Policy Centre, 2002).
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minority nationalisms in Flanders and in Brittany, were tainted by the collabora-
tion of some of their members with Nazism. Since then, the European political
arena has been open to nationalist and regionalist movements that have empha-
sized territorial and inclusive nationalism and democracy, and not to those that
cleave to ethnic exclusiveness or racism. It has thus encouraged the growth of a
self-consciously ‘civic’ nationalism.17 Such movements would include the
Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, Convergència i Unió, Esquerra Republicana
de Catalunya or Volksunie/ Spirit. The Basque PNV moved away quite early from
the ethnic exclusivism of Sabino Arana (though this element has never quite dis-
appeared) and was an early convert to Europeanism, encouraged by its links with
the international Christian Democratic movement.18
Efforts by extreme right wing or ethnically exclusive or racist parties to adapt to
Europe have been less successful, since they violate the founding norms of the
post-war European order. The Italian Lega Nord has gone through a series of policy
realignments but for much of its history has emphasized the ability of Lombardy
and then Padania to operate in Europe, if only it were freed of the incubus of the
Mezzogiorno and the Italian state.19 By the mid-1990s, it had adopted a policy of
independence in Europe in which northern Italy could join the Euro, leaving the
south with the Lira. They failed to gain any allies among other regions and nation-
alities, largely because of their racism and extremism, and found that the Europe
they sought to join was antagonistic to their values. In 1994 they were forced out
of the European Free Alliance.20 By 2001 they had changed their rhetoric to
become strong defenders of the (albeit federalized) Italian state against Europe.
The Lega dei Ticinesi in Italian-speaking Switzerland takes much the same line. In
Flanders, the Vlaams Blok rejects civic nationalism in favour of ethnic exclusive-
ness, favouring a European confederation of peoples, or ethnic states, including
central and eastern Europe. Yet despite its references to movements like those in
Scotland and Catalonia it has failed to gain any allies and, like the other extreme
right parties, it has fallen back on an anti-European rhetoric.21
Radical left nationalists also tend to hostility to Europe, seeing it as a capital-
ist club dominated by large states. So Herri Batasuna and its successors in the
Basque Country have no time for EU, nor has Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland. The
Bloque Nacionalista Galego (of Galicia in Spain) for long purveyed a populist anti-
European rhetoric, portraying Galicia as a even more peripheralized in Europe
17. Keating, Michael, Nations against the State. The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec,
Catalonia and Scotland, 2nd edition, (London: Palgrave, 2001)
18. Alexander Ugalde, “Las relaciones internacionales del nacionalismo vasco”, in Francisco
Aldecoa and Michael Keating (ed), Paradiplomacia: las relaciones internacionales de las regiones
(Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001).
19. Roberto Biorcio, La Padania Promessa (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1997).
20. Peter Lynch, Minority Nationalism and European Integration (Cardiff: University of Wales
Press, 1996).
21. Cesáreo Aguilera de Prat, Partidos y estrategias nacionalistas en Cataluña, Escocia y
Flandes (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanc, 2002).
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than in Spain.22 Radical leftist groups in Brittany and in Occitania (France) similar-
ly excoriated the EC/EU. Until at least the 1970s, an ideological underpinning for
these radical leftist parties was provided by internal colonialism, an extrapolation
of the Third World struggles for liberation back to the imperial countries of Europe.
Gradually this theme lost its attraction or relevance and a certain ideological shift
took place, aided by the emphasis on social solidarity and cultural pluralism in the
European discourse of the 1980s. In some cases, including the Galician and
Breton movements, this led to a discovery of Europe and the deployment of the
theme of a Europe of the Peoples as an alternative to the states23 bringing them
closer to Plaid Cymru and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. 
4. AN USABLE PAST
Nationality movements usually look back as well as forward, rooting their
claims and seeking legitimacy in a historic past that is itself continually reinvent-
ed. Yet the scope for invention is limited by the available materials, and by their
present resonance. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nationalist
movements often evoked a myth of ancient independence and precocious state-
hood, crushed by external repression. Sabino Arana anachronistically tried to pre-
sent the Basque provinces (initially just Vizcaya) as nation-states with full sover-
eignty until broken by the Spanish state.24 Many contemporary nationality
movements, by contrast, have chosen to present themselves as the most
European of the Europeans and have rediscovered pre-state traditions of shared
sovereignty and pactism, which lend themselves to the new European dispensa-
tion.25 Such historical revisionism has been favoured by the rediscovery of region-
al history26 and efforts to construct a history of Europe as opposed to its states.27
So Scottish intellectuals have emphasized the lack of a tradition of unitary state
sovereignty in Scots law and philosophy28 and stress Scotland’s early European
22. Michael Keating, “Les nationalités minoritaires d’Espagne face à l’Europe”, Etudes interna-
tionales, XXX.4 (1999): 729-43. Michael Keating, “Rethinking the Region. Culture, Institutions and
Economic Development in Catalonia and Galicia”, European Urban and Regional Studies, 8.3 (1999):
217-34. Michael Keating, “The minority nations of Spain and European integration: a new framework
for autonomy?”, Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, 1.1 (2000); 29-42.
23. Michael Keating, Nations against the State. Michel Nicolas, Bretagne, un destin européen
(Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2001).
24. Sabino Arana, Bizkaya por su independencia, extract in Santiago de Pablo, José Luis de la
Granja and Ludger Mees (eds), Documentos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco (Barcelona:
Ariel, 1998). 
25. Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy. 
26. Celia Applegate, “A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National
Places in Modern Times”, The American Historial Review 104.4 (1999): 1157-82.
27. Norman Davies, Europe. A History (London: Pimlico, 1997).
28. Neil MacCormick, “Is There a Scottish Path to Constitutional Independence?”, Parliamentary
Affairs, 53 (2000): 721-36. William Ferguson, The Identity of the Scottish Nation. An Historic Quest
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998). Paul H. Scott, Andrew Fletcher and the Treaty of Union
(Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992).
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connections. Catalans have taken as a reference point Catalonia’s status before
1714, as a self-governing nation within a complex confederal arrangement stand-
ing between ‘Spain’ and Europe29 Welsh nationalists emphasize community as an
almost mythical alternative to the classic form of nation. Basque nationalism has
reinterpreted the - ancient rights or fueros of the historic territories as a form of
pactism based on shared sovereignty. Intellectuals in turn have used such old
doctrines to back claims for divided sovereignty within Spain and Europe.30
In other cases, such argumentation carries less weight. Breton claims that
the Revolution illegitimately broke the terms of the treaty of 1532 by which the
province was annexed to France31 clash with the powerful image of the
Revolution itself and its democratising myths. The Belgian lands have a usable
past in the form of the Burgundian and later imperial order, with its complex pat-
terns of rights and usages and nationalists have long engaged in historiographi-
cal wars.32 Yet modern Flanders and Wallonia, do not correspond to the historic
units but are a product of social and political modernization since the nineteenth
century; and the constitutional legacy is slight. Padania, the imagined nation of
the Lega Nord has had to do with a concocted vision of itself as ‘the oldest com-
munity in Europe’33, which convinces nobody. 
In central and eastern Europe, a powerful theme after the fall of Communism
was the ‘return to Europe’. This is rather ambivalent, as it can refer to several dif-
ferent visions of Europe, past, present and future. The availability of a usable
past also varies. Silesians are pressing into use their history as a borderland and
quintessentially European people as a way of resolving their confused national
identity question.34 Hungarians of Banat have drawn on the Habsburg cultural
heritage and their history of inter-ethnic harmony.35 There is even a broader re-
29. Eduardo Moreno and Francisco Martí, Catalunya para españoles (Barcelona: DORESA,
1977). Salvador Giner, Lluís Flaquer, Jordi Busquet and Núria Bultà, La cultura catalana: el sagrat i
el profà (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1996). Ricard Lobo, “La devolución de la soberanía”, in Xavier Bru
de Sala, Gemma Garcia, Anna Grau, Ricard Lobo, Magda Oranich, Martí Parellada, Augustí Pons and
Josep-Maria Puigjaner, El modelo catalán. Un talante político (Barcelona: Flor del Viento1997).
Joaquim Albareda i Salvadò, and Pere Gifre i Ribes, Historia de la Catalunya moderna (Barcelona:
Edicions de la Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, 1999). Jaime Vicens Vives, Approaches to the History
of Spain, 2nd edition (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970).
30. Miguel Herrero de Miñon, Derechos Históricos y Constitución (Madrid: Taurus, 1998).
Miguel Herrero de Miñon, and Ernest Lluch, Derechos Históricos y Constitucionalismo Util
(Barcelona: Crítica, 2001).
31. Michel Nicola, Bretagne. 
32. Lode Wils, Histoire des national belges (Ottignies: Quorum, 1996). Louis Vos, “Recons -
tructions of the Past in Belgum and Flanders”, in Bruno Coppieters and Michel Huysseune (eds),
Secession, History and the Social Sciences (Brussels: Brussels University Press, 2002).
33. G. Oneto, L’invenzione della Padania. La rinascita della communità più antica d’Europa
(Bergamo: Foedus, 1997).
34. Luiza Bialasiewicz, “Upper Silesia: Rebirth of a Regional Identity in Poland”, Regional and
Federal Studies, 12.2 (2002): 111-132.
35. Judy Batt, “Reinventing Banat”, Regional and Federal Studies, 12.2 (2002): 178-202.
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assessment of the Habsburg experience, which twentieth century historiography
assumed had to break-up as an inevitable consequence of democratisation,
since the nationalities would only be fulfilled in their own state. Yet as early as
1848 there were thinkers advocating new form of multinational order; the Czech
national leader Palacky went so far as to claim that if the Austrian empire did not
exist it would be necessary to invent it.36 The Hungarian Eötvos favoured more
complex solutions still, retaining the historic Crownlands, which were not drawn
along strictly ethnic lines, but providing for local self-government within these.37
The Austro-Marxists Renner and Bauer advocated separating personal from terri-
torial nationality altogether, but with both coming under an overarching transna-
tional order.38 The Czech national leaders Masaryk and Benes favoured self-gov-
ernment within the empire until the First World War and fear of German
domination rendered such schemes impossible.39 On the other hand, the
Habsburg legacy has negative connotations across much of the region, and the
discourse of ‘recovered’ national statehood is powerful theme; this is often com-
bined with a profound suspicion of federalism or any territorial recognition of
minority claims.40
It is hardly surprising that small nations and nationalities, with big and pow-
erful neighbours, should not have developed doctrines of absolute state sover-
eignty, preferring to put their faith in over-arching and transnational security and
market regimes. This was the view of Masaryk41 and it finds an echo in other
small nations.42 The ideological expression of this sentiment and its associated
traditions in parts of Europe provide an important doctrinal instrument in the
emerging complex European order. Self-determination in this context is less
about establishing a separate state, than about constituting the nation as the
subject of political claims, with certain inherent rights, which then need to be
negotiated in a wider order. In this way, pre-modern and post-modern concep-
36. Batt, “Fuzzy Statehood”.
37. Ibid.
38. Otto Bauer, The question of nationalities and social democracy, translated by Joseph
O’Donnell; edited by Ephraim Nimni; foreword by Heinz Fisher (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota
Press, 2000). Ephraim Nimni, “Nationalist multiculturalism in late imperial Austria as a critique of
contemporary liberalism: the case of Bauer and Renner”, Journal of Political Ideologies, 4.3 (1999):
289-314. 
39. C.A.Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969).
Frederick Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Turner, 1944).
Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire. Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg
Monarchy, 1848-1919 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950 and New York: Octagon,
1977). Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires. Central Europe, Russia and the
Middle East, 1914-1923 (London: Routledge, 2001).
40. André Liebich, Ethnic Minorities and Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement, RSC
Working Paper 98/49, Florence: European University Institute, 1998).
41. Alan Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918 (London: Longman,
1989).
42. Pau Puig i Scotoni, Pensar els camins a la sobirania (Barcelona: Mediterrànea, 1998).
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tions of order meet. The resulting doctrines, however, are often vague. Some,
like the Catalan CiU, make a virtue of this, arguing that their constitutional doc-
trines must evolve along with Europe, while others postulate a utopian vision of a
Europe of the Peoples in which the state has withered away. In the meantime,
nationality movements seek to exploit existing opportunities in the form of
regionalism, minority rights regimes, and European constitutional reform. 
5. THE NEW REGIONALISM
The impossibility of fitting the nation into the procrustean bed of the state or
of breaking states into territorially coherent national units is one of the most
powerful criticisms of nationalist doctrine, Brubaker’s ‘architectonic illusion’.43
One trend in analyses of late modernity detects an ‘end of territory’44 as the
bonds of identity, function and space are severed. In this context, nationalities
could be reconceptualized as non-spatial cultural communities and endowed
with various forms of non-territorial rights.45 The debate about nationalities and
nationalism then flows into the more general debate about multiculturalism and
group rights. Nationality claims, with their assertion of self-governing rights, how-
ever, are more than mere claims for cultural recognition – indeed in some places
their cultural content is rather small. They do still entail territorial autonomy and,
indeed, territory is in many ways becoming more important. Yet the significance
of territory is changing as a result of functional transformations in the state and
transnational systems. This has allowed nationalist movements in Western
Europe to embrace the ‘new regionalism’, which promises a territorial basis for
self-rule but without the exclusive connotations of territorial control implied in
classical nationalist doctrine. 
The new regionalist paradigm embraces functional change, institution-build-
ing and new ways of conceptualising territorial politics.46 The most important
strand concerns the importance of local and regional levels for economic devel-
opment and change, within global and European markets.47 Much of this litera-
ture stresses also the social construction of the region and the role of norms,
collective identities and shared memories in facilitating social co-operation and
change.48 The key powers are no longer those held by the classic state, such as
43. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed.
44. Bertrand Badie, La fin des territoires. Essai sur le désordre international et sur l’utilité socia-
le du respect (Paris: Fayard, 1995).
45. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
46. Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe. Territorial Restructuring and
Political Change (Aldershot: Edward Elgar,1998).
47. Allen Scott, Regions and the World Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
Michael Storper, The Regional World. Territorial Development in a Global Economy (New York;
Guildford, 1997).
48. Michael Keating, John Loughlin and Kris Deschouwer, Culture, Institutions and Economic
Development. A Study of Eight European Regions (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 2003).
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tariff policy or even macro economic powers, but rather supply-side factors that
stimulate entrepreneurship and adaptation. Many of these powers, including
education, training, infrastructure and planning, are held by sub-state govern-
ments. Reterritorialization is also occurring in other functional systems, including
language and culture, despite the availability of new forms of communication
technology in which distance is not a factor. This is because instruments like
education and other public services essential to maintaining a cultural communi-
ty, are usually territorial, and because face to face communication remains
important. 
This territorialization of nationality and cultural claims is visible in Flanders,
where a linguistic group has become strongly territorialized, uniting previously
rather disparate provinces and localities. The autonomous community of the
Basque Country has emerged as an important unit, although based on three
separate historic territories, themselves part of a wider but territorially ill-defined
Basque cultural region. Wales, previously so divided between north and south as
to make any project of national self-government impossible, has found a new
unity as a European region. 
This process has also involved institution-building in state and civil society.
States have devolved to their constituent territories to varying degrees, both to
accommodate autonomist demands and for reasons of functional efficacy.
Interest groups and other elements of civil society have in turn adapted, to con-
solidate the territory as a social, economic and political system. Given the
decline of states’ abilities to manage their spatial economies, such regions are
increasingly competing with each other for investment, technology and markets,
within European and global space. It is not surprising then, that stateless nations
have often emerged as sites of such region-building, with nation-building elites
committed to new regionalist theories about the ability of small units to compete
in European space autonomously. There is no consensus on what to call these
new territorial systems of action or on what the political implications are. Allen
Scott writes of ‘regional directorates’.49 The term ‘regional state’ was coined by
Kenichi Ohmae in a rather breathless but acultural and ahistorical account of the
emergence of regional systems which are supposedly replacing the nation-
state.50 The term is taken up by Thomas Courchene51 and, in the context of the
nationalities debate, by Alain-G. Gagnon52 who sees the regional state as a way
out of the Quebec dilemma between federalism and independence. Catalan
authors, in recalling Catalonia before 1714, have written of its as an incomplete
49. Scott, Regions and the World Economy. 
50. Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State. The Rise of Regional Economies (New York:
Free Press, 1995).
51. Thomas J. Courchene, A State of Minds. Toward a Human Capital Future for Canadians
(Montreal: Institute for Research in Public Policy, 2001).
52. Alain-G Gagnon, “Le Québec, une nation inscrite au sein d’une démocratie étriquée”, in
Jocelyn McCure and Alain-G. Gagnon (eds), Repères en mutation. Identité et citoyenneté dans le
Québec contemporain (Montreal: Québec-Amérique, 2001).
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state, but a state nonetheless.53 Georg Jellinek in the nineteenth century wrote
of fragments of state, entities that have some but not all of the characteristics of
statehood.54
The possibility thus exists of territorially integrated nations and nationalities
gaining a substantial degree of functional autonomy within the new regional polit-
ical economy. Identity and culture, previously seen as an obstacle to moderniza-
tion, may be assets in the new development paradigm. This is not because terri-
tories like Scotland, Catalonia or Flanders have any natural coincidence between
territory, identity and functional systems, but because the evolution of the western
European state and transnational order has encouraged stateless nation and
region builders to construct new systems of action. The new regionalism, with its
territorial focus, also encourages nationalists to adopt an inclusive or territorial
conception of the nation. So territorial devolution within the state and a role for
regions within the EU (see below) might be useful mechanisms for accommodat-
ing nationalities. Yet it may be difficult to apply the territorial solution in central
and Eastern Europe, as recommended by Will Kymlicka55 and others, where the
nationalities have not undergone the same process of territorial consolidation. 
6. FRAGMENTED TERRITORIES
Territory and nationality do not coincide where more than one group shares
the same territory; where one group straddles two territories; and in combina-
tions of these. One solution is deterritorialized forms of autonomy such as the
Austro-Marxist proposals for personal autonomy. Yet these, like consociational
arrangements, can be criticized for reifying an exclusive ethnicity, and for under-
mining territorial self-government and there are few opportunities for non-territo-
rial autonomy in Europe. A more promising idea is that of partially territorialized
solutions, in which territories are open rather than closed and their citizens can
profess different degrees of identity with it. A nationality can thus have a territo-
rial base without either monopolizing this territory or being confined to it. This
concords with modern understandings of space in political geography, allowing a
more open conception of the region, with less rigidly defined boundaries and
complex identities.56
Under the Habsburg Empire territorial autonomy through the Crownland sys-
tem corresponded rather imperfectly to the self-identifying nationality groups.
53. Nùria Sales, Els sigles de la decadència, Vol. IV of Història de Catalunya (Barcelona:
Edicions 62, 1989).
54. Georg Jellinek, Fragmentos de Estado, translation of Uber Staatsfragmente (Madrid: Civitas,
1981).
55. Will Kymlicka, “Reply and Conclusion”, in Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski (eds), Can
Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
56. Anssi Paasi, “Place and region: regional world and words”, Progress in Human Geography,
26.6 (2002): 802-11.
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The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, while providing for territorial
autonomy, allows people to identify variously with Ulster, Northern Ireland, all
Ireland, or the United Kingdom. In central and eastern Europe in the 1990s, a
number of states57 passed or proposed laws giving special status to co-nationals
in neighbouring countries. These could be read in two ways: as a provocative
gesture of extraterritorial jurisdiction and covert irredentism; or as a way of secur-
ing nationality rights without moving borders. The Hungarian law of 2001 was
particularly controversial, since it came in a context in which some nationalist
politicians had talked of ‘reversing Trianon’ and restoring the old Hungary.
Romania and Slovakia saw it as a vestige of old fashioned ethnic nationalism,
while the Hungarian government defended it as an example of the multiple iden-
tity politics possible in the new Europe of cultural diversity.58 Eventually the issue
required mediation through the Council of Europe. Ironically, Hungarian acces-
sion to the EU means that the law will have to be abandoned since it will no
longer be possible to discriminate among European citizens, or indeed among
third party nationals.
Europe provides powerful incentives for external homelands of minorities to
work together, where they are current or prospective members of European insti-
tutions. This has been a factor in central Europe and in Cyprus where the
prospect of Turkish EU membership has provided an incentive for compromise.
The Council of Europe, has also helped by abandoning its old doctrine that dual
citizenship is a source of conflict and, in the 1997 Convention on Nationality,
actively encouraging it in certain circumstances.59 We may thus see a more
open-ended or ‘fuzzy’ regionalism, in which a territory may be a homeland for a
nationality group, providing symbolic recognition and some public goods, while
containing pressures to move state borders. Such homelands may be states or,
as in Catalonia and the Basque Country, autonomous regions.
7. OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
The emerging European order is complex and multilayered, with a range of
continental bodies, not all of which have the same territorial coverage. There is
the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe and a range of interstate and inter-regional bodies.
Although the European theme first entered the discourse of minority national-
57. Slovenia, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia passed such laws and Poland considered it. Only
the Hungarian Law specified the neighbouring countries to which it would apply, Romania, Ukraine,
Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia.
58. Brigid Fowler, Fuzzing citizenship, nationalising political space: A framework for intepreting
the Hungarian ‘status law’ as a new form of kin-state policy in Central and Eastern Europe, One
Europe or Several Programme Working Paper, 40/02 (Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2002).
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Paper Containing the
Position of the Hungarian Government in Relation to the Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring
Countries (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2001). 
59. The law on Hungarians abroad, however, was promoted as a substitute for dual citizenship. 
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ists between the two world wars with visions of a European federation of
nations, the Euro pean Economic Community attracted little enthusiasm among
the minorities, who tended to see it as remote, bureaucratic and unsympathet-
ic to nationality claims. Some vague expressions of support for Europeanism
remained, but without a clear institutional expression. During the 1980s and
1990s, however, institutional incentives emerged for minority parties to enter
the European political game.60 Direct elections to the European Parliament from
1979 encouraged minorities to organize and in 1981 the European Free
Alliance was created linking minority and nationalist parties and creating a
forum for dialogue and debate about building a new Europe. The 1980s also
saw a deepening of European integration and extension of Community compe-
tencies into new areas, together with a strengthening of its supranational
aspects and an institutionalization of the regional level. Notable switchers from
an anti-European to a pro-European position have been the Scottish National
Party, the Volksunie, Plaid Cymru, Union démocratique breton and, to some
degree, the Bloque Nacionalista Galego.61
In the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a flurry of interest in the con-
cept of a Europe of the Regions. Never clearly specified, this seemed to refer
to an order in which regions were recognized as a third level of government
alongside states and the European Union itself.62 Regions and stateless
nations were too heterogeneous ever to fit into such a scheme and in practice
it evolved into a series of opportunities to intervene in EU policy making, either
by direct links to Brussels or via the Member States. Nationalities may be able
to adapt themselves to these regional opportunity structures, and to ally them-
selves to ‘non-national’ and powerful regions; at the same time it gives further
incentives to territorialize nationality claims. A clause in the 1992 Treaty on
European Union allows regional ministers to represent Member States in the
Council of Ministers where domestic law permits and regional matters are at
stake. This is applied in Germany, Austria, Belgium and the United Kingdom in
various ways. In the United Kingdom, participation by Scottish and Welsh min-
isters is at the discretion of the central government. In Germany, the role of
the Länder is entrenched and they participate by right. In Belgium, the regions
and communities have external competencies corresponding exactly to their
internal competencies, and the right to represent the state in the Council of
Ministers where these are concerned. While in Germany, the Länder must
come to a common position, in Belgium all the relevant governments must
60. Lieven De Winter and Margarita Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, “European Integration and
Ethnoregionalist Parties”, Party Politics, 8.4 (2002): 483-503.
Lieven De Winter, The Impact of European Integration on Ethnoregionalist Parties, Working
Papers, 195 (Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Politiques i Socials, 2001).
61. Lieven De Winter, “The Volksunie and the dilemma between policy success and electoral
survival in Flanders”, in Lieven de Winter and Huri Tursan (eds), Regionalist Parties in Western Europe
(London: Routlege, 1998). Peter Lynch, Minority Nationalism and European Integration (Cardiff:
University of Wales Press, 1996). Nicolas. Bretagne. Keating, “The Minority Nations of Spain”.
62. Udo Bullman, Die Politik der dritten Ebene. Regionen im Europa der Union (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 1994).
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agree, giving each a veto in matters falling within its jurisdiction. Spanish
autonomous communities have not yet succeeded in gaining such rights. So,
while European high policymaking remains largely intergovernmental, there are
mechanisms for regions to act, provided they first achieve victory in domestic
constitutional arenas. 
A lot of attention has been given to the Structural Funds as a means of giv-
ing regions access to Brussels, a partnership with the Commission, and a source
of funding independent of Member States. In practice, this field is intergovern-
mental and regions have no means of getting money directly from Brussels. The
Funds are, rather, an arena for symbolic politics, in which regional politicians can
claim to have established a funding link to Brussels, while the EU can claim cred-
it for looking after vulnerable regions. In this way, they have helped bring
Europeanism and regionalist and minority claims further together.
A more direct form of access is the Committee of the Regions. This has
proved a disappointment to regionalists and minority nationalists because of its
weak powers and lack of resources and because it represents all levels of sub-
Member State government equally. Frustrated at having to share a place with
municipal governments, the strong regions, stateless nations and federated
units launched an initiative for the Regions with Legislative Powers, or
Constitutional Regions,63 seeking recognition of their place in the European con-
stitution. Although these do not always correspond to cultural or national regions
or minorities, there is enough of an overlap to make common cause among
German Länder and Italian regions, Scotland, Wales, Flanders and Catalonia in
asserting the need for a recognized third level within the European architecture.
While they have as yet achieved few concrete results, they have created another
discursive space in which dialogue and exchange takes place about the building
of Europe. Such dialogue is also pursued by the many regional offices in
Brussels, which have become part of the policy community and an important link
in the exchange of ideas and policy initiatives. Another arena is the Council of
Europe, whose Committee of Regional and Local Authorities has been divided
into two chambers, for the regions and the municipalities. This has produced a
European Charter of Local Self Government and a draft European Charter of
Regional Self Government.
An important opportunity lies in the transformation of borders. Borders
remain important as expressions of state sovereignty and are for the first time
generally uncontested; but they are losing their functional significance. These
twin changes have encouraged new forms of cross-border penetration and co-
operation, which are no longer automatically seen as threats to the state. As
empirical studies have shown, identities in border regions are typically complex,
with individuals both identifying with their respective states and with a transbor-
der nationality or ethnic group, defying a simple geographical definition of identi-
63. Technically these are separate initiatives, but only for institutional reasons, as one is based
on the EU and the other on the Council of Europe. 
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ty.64 Permeable borders allow a renegotiation of these and the emergence of new
forms of layered identity. Others have talked of porous or ‘fuzzy borders’.65 On a
more concrete level, there is scope for cross-border functional co-operation on
economic, environmental and cultural matters, allowing more expression for the
new regionalism. The Council of Europe produced the Madrid Convention which
provides a legal instrument for cross-border partnership. The EU has a substan-
tial programme of cross-border partnerships under the INTER-REG initiative,
which by the end of the 1990s was active across every border within the EU and
with the candidate countries as well. Experience of cross-border partnership has
been mixed, since difference in legal systems and political incentives, together
with the tendency of regions and localities to be in competition for investment,
have often stymied genuine partnership.66 The effects on identity are also subtle.
There are few instances of border communities on abandoning their state identi-
ties to find a common ethnic or national one. Co-opereation has, however,
helped redefine borders as complex zones in which multiple identities can be
expressed and negotiated. 
These regional opportunities are closed to non-territorialized minorities, which
instead look to rights protection. Until the end of the Cold War, Europe lacked a
common minority rights regime and efforts to apply the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights to the collective rights of minorities were
rebuffed.67 Since the 1990s, European institutions have gradually and hesitantly
been building a minority rights regime but this has three key features. It tends to
focus on the rights of individuals belonging to minorities rather than the minorities
themselves; it emphasises access to services and cultural guarantees rather than
political autonomy, especially territorial autonomy; and it works though states,
allowing them to define the problem and control access to European means of
redress. A Charter of Regional and Minority Languages was adopted by the
Council of Europe in 1992, with reservations by several states, including the
United Kingdom and France; eventually France failed to ratify it. The enforcement
mechanism is a three-yearly report to the Council of Ministers.68 More ambitious
is the 1995 Framework Convention on National Minorities, designed to be adopt-
ed in appropriate form by signatory states but without direct application. It does
64. Zoe Bray, Boundaries and identities in Bidasoa-Txingudi on the Franco-Spanish frontier,
doctoral thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2002. David Kaplan, “Conflict and
Compromise among Borderland Identities in Northern Italy”, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale
Geografie, 91.1 (2000): 44-60. Peter Sahlins, Boundaries : the making of France and Spain in the
Pyrenees (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1989). Jorunn Sem Fure, The German-Polish
Border Region. A Case of Regional Integration?, ARENA Working Papers, 97/19, Oslo: ARENA
Project, 1997.
65. Batt, “Fuzzy Statehood”.
66. John W. Scott, “European and North American Contexts for Cross-Border Regionalism”,
Regional Studies, 33.13 (1999): 605-17.
67. Christian Hillgruber and Matthias Jestaedt, The European Convention on Human Rights and
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not define or recognize minorities, but rather addresses the rights of individual
members of minorities, determined by a mixture of self-designation and objective
criteria. Matters covered include the use of language, education, the media, pub-
lic administration, commercial signs and cross-border contacts. The Convention
stands out among the European instruments for its intention to protect and pre-
serve the minority communities themselves, so going beyond the mere prohibition
of discrimination. On the other hand, signatory states themselves were allowed to
designate their own minorities before ratification. So Estonia included only its own
citizens in its scope, refusing to recognize Russians who had not met it strict citi-
zenship requirements; Russia’s own reservation specifically aimed to deny this.
Luxembourg, worried about the rights of immigrants and their descendants, con-
fined its protection to minorities who had been present for ‘several generations’
and then declared that, on this criterion, there were no minorities in Luxembourg.
Other states, however, took the matter more seriously and many national minori-
ties were expressly singled out for protection.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has a High
Commissioner for National Minorities. Originally intended as a trouble-shooting
operation in actual or potential conflicts, the role has extended to the realm of
minority rather than purely individual rights. It has so far been confined entirely to
the countries of central and Eastern Europe. The OSCE also enters into the field
for minority protection through the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.69
The European Union has been reluctant to be drawn into questions of minority
rights but it has proved impossible to remain entirely aloof. An article in the Treaty
on European Union (Maastricht) pledged support for cultural diversity and the
European Parliament used this to establish a Bureau of Lesser Used Lan guages in
Dublin. Negotiations for the admission of the countries of central and Eastern
Europe brought the issue to the fore and the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 includ-
ed respect for minorities. Regular accession reports note progress on the issue and
call for change where necessary. There has been some movement towards the
acceptance of group rights, perhaps motivated by security and immigration consid-
erations, notably the position of Russians in the former Soviet republics.
Discrimination against Roma also featured quite prominently as an issue. 
The EU’s approach has often relied on principles and processes from the
Council of Europe and the OSCE, with their prior experience.70 So it has pressed
candidate countries to adopt the Framework Convention on National Minorities,
widely accepted within the existing Member States, rather than the more contro-
versial European Convention on Regional and Minority Languages.71 The 1995
69. Florence Benoît-Rohmer, The minority question in Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Euro pe,
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Stability Pact (Plan Balladur), in which the EU encouraged candidate countries to
settle minorities and border issues among themselves, was formally sponsored by
the OSCE.72 This is a patchwork approach but, by individual initiatives linked
across the various institutions, a minority rights regime of sorts has come into
being.73 Accession will be a key test of this regime, since the Amsterdam Treaty of
1997 incorporating the Copenhagen criteria into the acquis de l’Union, left out
the minority rights clauses.74 This implies that, after accession, either the EU will
cease to monitor minority rights in the new Member States, or it will have to adopt
a new instrument to monitor them also in the existing Member States as well. 
8. STATE ADAPTATION
Europe thus allows a loosening of state control and the externalisation of
previously centralized functions, but the response depends on adaptation of
states themselves, which remain gatekeepers between nationalities and Europe.
Belgium has generally bent to the process of integration by handing powers down
to the communities and regions and upwards to Europe. At times it looks as
though the state itself will disappear, although it is precisely the ability to exter-
nalise problems that allows it to stay together in some form. The United Kingdom
has turned itself into an asymmetrical multinational state. It is as though, never
having gone through the national revolution and retaining many features of an
ancien régime, it has been able to jump from a pre-modern to a post-modern
state form directly. Europe has helped here in various ways, despite the prevail-
ing Euroscepticism. The European framework is one factor that made possible
the Good Friday agreement in which both the United Kingdom and the Republic
of Ireland put their claims over Northern Ireland into abeyance.75 It allowed a set-
tlement for Scotland in 1998 that was much less set about with safeguards and
restrictions than that proposed in 1978. States based upon Napoleonic princi-
ples of unity and uniformity have found it more difficult to adapt, despite being in
general pro-European. These include the obvious example of France as well as
Italy and even Spain, where the present government has tended to react to the
challenge to its sovereignty by more aggressive assertion of its remaining prerog-
atives and a resistance to further devolution. In central and eastern Europe,
there is a widespread fear of separatism and distrust of federal solutions as
states, having just recovered their independence, are reluctant to lose it. Yet
here too there are differences. Romania has tended to emphasis the French
model of unitary citizenship as the basis for democracy. Hungary, mindful of the
large number of Hungarians in neighbouring states, has argued for a looser and
more complex idea of nationality and citizenship. Poland, living with the memory
of partition, has stressed national unity and sought to restrict regionalism to a
72. Liebich, Ethnic Minorities. 
73. Jennifer Jackson Preece, National Minorities and the European Nation-States System
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limited functional type, not based on historic regions and framed within the
Polish state rather than at a European level. States have differed in the extent to
which they have allowed their regions to operate within Europe. 
9. THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE
Much has been written about multilevel governance in Europe, about plural-
ism and the complexity of policy-making structures.76 Yet without a constitution,
it is feared, Europe lacks a clear normative basis and becomes merely an arena
for group competition. This applies equally to the nationalities question, where
we are witnessing a plethora of claims to self-determination, historic and present
rights and original sovereignty. Such a complex normative order requires a new
form of constitutional thinking, adapted to a world in which the old triad of
nation, territory and sovereignty can no longer be taken for granted. 
Constitutionalism has increasingly been detached conceptually from the
state, with an appreciation that constitutions may exist at multiple levels and
that constitutionalism itself may be as much a process as a final and definitive
set of rules. The expression ‘metaconstitutionalism’ has been coined for the
realm in which the various constitutional visions meet and are negotiated.77
Within such a framework, a constitutional pluralism is possible, in which various
forms of order and sovereignty claims can coexist, including those of shared and
divided sovereignty. There are two versions of arguments about divided sover-
eignty. One is to the effect that sovereignty is still in principle indivisible, but that,
since a number of actors at different levels are making claims to it, we have not
alternative to compromise among them. Politics thus comes in where constitu-
tional theory falls down. So the Basque Nationalists claim that, since the 1978
Spanish constitution did not recognize their original rights and did not gain the
support of an absolute majority of Basques in the referendum, it is not legiti-
mate.78 This does not stop them working within it. There is an unresolved intel-
lectual and legal question about the source and nature of sovereignty in
Scotland, but it does not stop politics proceeding. In an open constitutional
order, we can live with many of these anomalies, and it is often preferable not to
resolve them. The other version is to see sovereignty not as a claim to the
monopoly of authority, but rather as a claim to an element of original authority
(that is not derived from a higher authority), but which recognizes the existence
of other sources of original authority which necessarily and inherently limit each
other. This is more consistent with the historic doctrines being refurbished in the
stateless nations of Europe. A European constitutionalism is thus possible in
which there is a shared European level, marked by common values and equal
76. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi-level governance and European integration
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rights, within which highly asymmetrical arrangements are possible reflecting the
status of different nationalities, states and regions. 
This would require a European constitution that was strong enough to pro-
vide an overarching framework, but flexible enough to allow diversity within it. A
European Union built on the lines of the traditional nation-state would fail to
meet the need for the same reasons as the states have. At the other extreme, a
Europe functioning merely as a holding company, a market order, or a conve-
nience for externalising difficult problems, would not sustain the common values
and constitutional order in which pluralism is possible. There may be an emerg-
ing constitutional practice, as we have seen in reviewing the various institutions
and strategies in Europe, but there is no overall framework for managing the new
national complexity.
The debates around the Convention on the Future of Europe and its draft
constitution provides some evidence for this. The national/regional question was
not a priority in the Convention, which was not tasked with proposing a new
statute for nations and national minorities. Nor could it challenge the sovereign-
ty of states and their authority head-on. On the contrary, the debates followed a
logic in which authority is divided in complex ways between European and state-
level institutions. So nationalities and regions must find their niche in a Europe of
the states rather than dreaming of their disappearance in favour of a utopian
Europe of the Peoples.79 Yet the various visions of Europe on offer provide more,
or less, space for the accommodation of nationalities. An intergovernmental
Europe based on the existing states clearly offers least scope for stateless
nationalities. An integrated but centralized and uniform Europe would offer little
more. So regions and nationalities have pressed for an integrated Europe but
one that is decentralized and pluralist. In this way, the pro-Europeanism of the
national minorities and stateless nations can serve as a means to legitimise the
European project itself by linking it to local mobilization and identity. Rather than
Europe seeking its own separate demos, therefore, it can be the framework for
multiple demoi, themselves constitutive, along with the state, of a larger political
community. Such a dispensation is closer to the idea of pluralistic federalism80
than of classical uniform federalism on the US model.
The clarification and demarcation of roles and responsibilities, however,
threatens to reduce the space available for regions and nationalities to those
specified in the new constitution. Indeed, the very process of constitution-making
may reduce those areas of uncertainty in which new forms of authority might be
negotiated, and Europe could end up as an obstacle to new forms of accommo-
dation. In the last major treaty revision, at Maastricht, opportunities were created
which Member States could use at their discretion (discussed above). In the pre-
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sent constitutional round, there seems less willingness to allow such differentia-
tion. The majority in the Convention and in the Committee of the Regions even
refused to distinguish between federated units and devolved national parliaments
on the one hand, and municipal government on the other. The Flemish govern-
ment and the Catalan Convention on Europe proposed that it be possible to divide
a Member State’s vote in the Council of Ministers, but this was a non-starter, as
was the European Free Alliance for ‘internal enlargement’ in which stateless
nations could become full members of the EU. The Basque government proposed
expanding on the Lamassoure proposal81 whereby regions could become partners
of the Union, to provide for the Basque Country to become an ‘associated state’.
Yet the original Lamassoure idea, which was already a long way from this, was fur-
ther diluted to a form of administrative decentralization. Nor has the EU agreed to
allow states to differentiate internally in their application of EU directives the way
they are allowed in many cases to differentiate between themselves. The numer-
ous exceptions in the existing treaties to accommodate regions including the
Canaries, the Azores and the Åland islands, are not to be generalized. Even the
proposal to recognize a category of regions with legislative powers fell victim to a
combination of those who considered that all regions were the same and those
who thought that they were so different that they were impossible to categorize. 
10. CONCLUSION
European integration has thus affected the nationalities question at three
levels, that of the state, that of the nationalities, and in the European arena
itself. Yet its impact is two-sided. On the one hand, the increasing language of
pluralism and divided sovereignty provides a discursive space for new authority
claims. There is a trend among the nationalities movements to adopt a post-sov-
ereign stance; to express a civic, inclusive form of nationalism; and to emphasize
their territorial basis. This has tamed and restrained nationalism, although some
ethnically exclusive and separatist movements still exist. States remain the
obstacle to utopian visions of a Europe of the Peoples, but some have adapted
to the new pluralism more than others. Europe, by externalising common func-
tions, permits a greater asymmetry within states. The European institutional
structure furnishes a set of opportunities for non-state actors to intervene, gain
recognition, build systems of action and secure protection. On the other hand,
the concrete opportunities available within Europe are limited and rather dis-
parate. Europe creates spaces for more diversity, but many of its institutional and
policy initiatives assume a homogeneous sub-State level of authority and identi-
ty.82 An intergovernmental European Union, with the states taking a restrictive
line on what their sub-state governments can do, will a premium on becoming a
state even if this should be the second choice of the nationalities themselves.
81. Alain Lamassoure, a French MEP, has proposed that regions could become ‘partners of the
Union’ with broad responsibilities for applying EU policy directly. The Commission has pursued the
idea in the form of tripartite contracts among the Commission, the Member State and the region. 
82. Carlos Closa, “La Pluralidad Nacional en un mismo Estado y en la UE”, in Ferran Requejo
(ed.), Democracia y pluralismo nacional (Barcelona: Ariel, 2002).
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So far, a gradual evolution has allowed Europe and the nationalities to adapt
in tandem, exploring new forms of political order. Formulas such as the ‘regional
state’, ‘fragment of state’ or ‘incomplete state’ have been criticized for their
implication that they are somehow unfinished, but this very characteristic marks
the evolution of Europe itself. An open and loose form of constitutionalism would
allow this process to continue, making adjustments where necessary. An effort to
close the process or to fix the status, categories and competencies of Europe,
Member States and nationalities and regions, would risk recreating the type of
misfit that has caused such problems in the past. 
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